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PASSIVE VOICE: THE UNCLEAR STANDARDS FOR
ESTABLISHING PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN NEW
MEXICO VIA THE WORLD WIDE WEB
MARK D. STANDRIDGE"
I. INTRODUCTION
"We often hear what the Internet can do for us. We should also think about what
the Internet can do to us."' An amalgam of interconnected computer-based
applications that includes "electronic mail ('e-mail'), automatic mailing list services
('mail exploders,' sometimes referred to as 'listservs'), 'newsgroups,' 'chat rooms,'
and the 'World Wide Web,"' 2 constitutes what we collectively know as "the
Internet."3 This technology has provided millions of users, from individuals seeking
to voice their opinions to Fortune 500 companies looking to expand their market
share, with nearly limitless opportunities for publishing information to the world."
With its rapid proliferation, however, the Internet has also brought about problems
for lawyers, judges, and information technology professionals trying to discern
whether or not a Web site will subject its creator or owner to a lawsuit. Specifically,
courts have struggled for years to determine at what point a site is so filled with
content that the individual or corporation that manages the site will be subjected to
personal jurisdiction.'
The New Mexico Court of Appeals took up the question of Internet-based
personal jurisdiction in Sublett v. Wallin.' The court held that a defendant
company's Web site, which conveyed information about the company's business
and featured a method for finding a local franchisee of the business, did not provide
sufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over the company.7
In reaching this decision, the court analyzed the two most prevalent approaches to
establishing personal jurisdiction via the Internet: the broad standard of Inset
Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 8 and the more narrow approach of Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.9 Aligning itself with the court in Zippo
Manufacturing,° the New Mexico Court of Appeals reasoned that primarily
"passive" Web sites such as the one in this case did not suffice for subjecting
potential defendants to the laws of New Mexico." However, the court ended the

* Class of 2006, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank Professor J. Michael
Norwood, my faculty advisor, for his invaluable guidance and encouragement on this Note, as well as Professor
Kip Bobroff for his input on the project. I would also like to thank Camille Pedrick Chavez and Kelly Waterfall,
my manuscript editors.
1. Deana D. Palmisano, PersonalJurisdictionandthe Internet:A PotentiallyEntangling Web (emphasis
added), at http://www.sessions-law.com/news.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
2. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
3. Id.
4. See id. at 850-53.
5. See generally Michael J. Dunne & Anna L. Musacchio, JurisdictionOver the Internet, 54 Bus. LAW.
385 (1998).
6. 2004-NMCA-089, 94 P.3d 845.
7. Id.IN 30, 33, 94 P.3d at 853.
8. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
9. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
10. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 29, 94 P.3d at 852; see infra text accompanying notes 181-184.
11. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 33, 94 P.3d at 853; see infra text accompanying notes 185-189.
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discussion there, leaving open the questions of whether or not an "active" Web site
would suffice to establish personal jurisdiction, as well as whether particular types
of suits-namely trademark, libel, and defamation-would merit a more scrutinized
Internet-based personal jurisdiction analysis. 12 This Note will examine the court's
findings on "passive" and "active" Web sites 3 against the backdrop of Internetbased personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, 4 as well as the implications of the
decision's unanswered questions. 5
II. BACKGROUND
In general terms, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction is the power of a court to decide a
matter in controversy and the control by the court over the" parties involved in a
given controversy. 6 Personal jurisdiction is critical to the litigants in any dispute,
as a judgment rendered by a court that does not have proper personal jurisdiction
cannot be enforced if properly challenged. 7 "A court may exercise two types of
personal jurisdiction: 'general jurisdiction,' which extends to all cases and controversies that may be brought before a court within the legal bounds of rights and
remedies; or 'specific jurisdiction,' which covers only a particular case or class of
cases."' 8 As it is "more limited in nature than general jurisdiction," specific
jurisdiction typically "requires a lower threshold of proof to be" established within
a forum. 9 Various factors are considered by courts when determining whether to
utilize specific or general jurisdiction.20 Such factors include the nature and quality
of a defendant's activities within the forum,2' as well as a defendant's advertising
habits within a forum state.22 When attempting to base personal jurisdiction on a
defendant's activities over the Internet, most courts in the United States have sought
specific jurisdiction.23
A. U.S. Supreme CourtPersonalJurisdictionJurisprudence
Any discussion of the concept of personal jurisdiction begins with the general
principles handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff24 and
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.25 Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to

12. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 1 33, 94 P.3d at 853; see infra text accompanying notes 196-199.
13. See infra PartIV.
14. See infra Parts II.C-E, V.A-B.
15. See infra Part V.
16. Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 5, at 386.
17. Id.
18. Id. See generally M.E. OCCHIALINO, WALDEN'S CIVIL PROCEDURE INNEW MEXICO (2d ed. 1988).
19. Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 5,at 386."For the purposes ofa jurisdictional analysis, only contacts
with a forum that are related to the underlying causes of action are to be considered." James P. Donohue, Personal
Jurisdiction,in I INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 9:4 (2004).
20. Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 5, at 387.
21. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (holding that jurisdiction was proper over
franchisee where he had entered into a contract and "established a substantial and continuing relationship with"
fianchisor in the franchisor's state of residence).
22. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (discussing the possibility of
establishing jurisdiction "through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the [forum]").
23. Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 5, at 386-87.
24. 95 U.S. 714 (1878), overruledby Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
25. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

Summer 20051

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

renderjudgment is grounded on the courts' power over the defendant's person.26 In
Pennoyer,the Supreme Court emphasized that a court has no personal jurisdiction
unless the person appears before it,27 is found in the state," is a resident of the
state, 29 or has property within the state.3" Therefore, the defendant's presence within
the territorial jurisdiction of a court was a prerequisite to the court's rendering of
a judgment that would personally bind the defendant. 3
Decades later, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the Pennoyer personal
jurisdiction principles in InternationalShoe. In its ruling in that case, the Supreme
Court held that, as
the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or
other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
'
suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."32
In the decades following InternationalShoe, federal and state courts have had
ample opportunity to shape and explain what kinds of "minimum contacts" are
necessary to subject a defendant to the laws and judgments of a given forum. 3 3 To
that end, a number ofjurisprudential tests have been fashioned by the courts.34 One
such test analyzes whether or not "a defendant targets a particular forum," and
whether "the effects of his or her action[s] are felt [so] strongly in" that forum that
the "defendant may be called to answer for" those actions there.35 In addition to this
"purposeful direction"" or "effects" test,37 there is the notion of "purposeful
availment,"3 a theory justifying jurisdiction where a party "reach[es] out beyond
one state and create[s] continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of
another state., 39 Where such relationships and obligations exist, the party is subject
to the regulations and sanctions in that state for the consequences of his or her
activities.40 As business and personal relationships permeate state lines, courts have
26. Id. at 316.
27. Pennoyer,95 U.S. at 733.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 723.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 733-34.
32. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). A capias ad
respondendum is "[a] writ commanding the sheriffto take the defendant into custody to ensure that the defendant
will appear in court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 200 (7th ed. 1999).
33. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,415-16 (1984) (holding
that a corporation's contacts with a state, including purchasing helicopter parts and training employees there, were
not sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction within that state); Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 442-43 (IIl. 1961) (holding that jurisdiction was proper where the court inferred that
defendant manufacturer's commercial transactions resulted in substantial use and consumption of defendant's
products in the forum state).
34. OCCHIALINO, supra note 18, § 1-22.
35. Donohue, supra note 19, § 9:5; see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 n.6 (1984).
36. Donohue, supra note 19, § 9:5.
37. See Calder,465 U.S. at 787 n.6.
38. Donohue, supra note 19, § 9:6.
39. BurgerKingCorp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,473 (1985) (quoting Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,
339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950)).
40. ld.; see also Donohue, supra note 19, § 9:6.
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continued to create mechanisms by which a party's minimum contacts may be
examined for purposes of establishing jurisdiction over that party.4'
B. State Long-Arm Statutes
One manner by which individual states have attempted to assert personal
jurisdiction over defendants outside their territories is by the promulgation of longarm statutes. 42 Essentially, there are two types of these statutes.43 One type of longarm statute encompasses those found in the states of, among others, Rhode Island 44
and Arkansas, 45 "which permit the exercise ofpersonal jurisdiction to the full extent
' Consequently, in these jurisdictions, a
permitted by the due process clause."46
court's analysis "collapses into a single step: evaluating whether personal jurisdiction comports with the requirements of due process under the U.S. Constitution."4' 7
Then, there are long-arm statutes like the ones found in Missouri 4 and New
Mexico, 49 which place limits beyond the Due Process Clause on a court's ability to
exercise personal jurisdiction. New Mexico, for example, limits the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over foreign entities to causes of action that arise from a
specific list of situations.5 '
Under the New Mexico Long-Arm Statute,52 a defendant's actions must satisfy

41. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (discussing the
"stream of commerce" test); see also Donohue, supra note 19, § 9:7.
42. Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 5, at 387; OCCHIALINO, supra note 18, § 1-17.
43. Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 5, at 387.
44. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1997) (stating that defendants outside of the state that "have the necessary
minimum contacts with the state.. shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the state... in every case not contrary to
the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States").
45. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101 (1999) ("The courts of this state shall have personal jurisdiction of all
persons, and all causes of action or claims for relief, to the maximum extent permitted by the due process of law
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.").
46. Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 5, at 387-88.
47. Id.
48. Mo. REv. STAT. § 506.500 (West 2003).
49. NMSA 1978, § 38-1-16 (1971).
50. Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 5, at 387.
51. NMSA 1978, § 38-1-16(A)(1971).
52. The New Mexico Long-Arm Statute, NMSA 1978, § 38-1-16 (1971), reads as follows:
Personal service of process outside state
A. Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through
an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or his
personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action
arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) the opeation of a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state;
(3) the commission of a tortious act within this state;
(4) the contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at the time
of contracting;
(5) with respect to actions for divorce, separate maintenance or annulment, the circumstance
of living in the marital relationship within the state, notwithstanding subsequent departure from
the state, as to all obligations arising from alimony, child support or real or personal property
settlements under Chapter 40, Article 4 NMSA 1978 if one party to the marital relationship
continues to reside in the state.
B. Service of process may be made upon any person subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this state under this section by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside
this state and such service has the same force and effect as though service had been personally
made within this state.
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one of five statutory conditions,5 3 one of which is the performance of a "transaction
of any business" within the state. 4 The defendants must also have sufficient
"minimum contacts" to satisfy constitutional due process standards in order for a
New Mexico court to obtain personal jurisdiction over that defendant.55 The "transaction of any business" element is an oft-litigated part of long-arm legislation: 6
New Mexico courts have equated transacting business with the due process standard
of "minimum contacts,"57 even though the New Mexico Long-Arm Statute makes
no specific mention of a "minimum contacts" standard. 8
The prime illustration of New Mexico courts' tendency to analyze "transaction
of any business" and "minimum contacts" in the same light is found in CabaLtd.
Liability Co. v. Mustang Software, Inc. 9 In Caba, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals held that a company that maintained a connection to a New Mexico
corporation by phone, fax, and mail while maintaining no physical presence in the
state did not conduct business within the state sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction.6" The defendant, Mustang Software, sold products in New Mexico
stores but did not itself maintain an office within the state.6' Mustang established
a relationship with the plaintiff Caba during a conference in California.62 Subsequent to that meeting, a series of telephone calls, faxes, and mailings (including a
Letter of Intent signed by both parties) transpired between the two companies,
resulting in an agreement whereby the plaintiff would create software for the
defendant.63 When that agreement was broken, plaintiffCaba attempted to bring suit
against Mustang, necessitating a personal jurisdiction inquiry.'
In determining whether or not a transaction of business under the long-arm
statute existed, the court of appeals applied a series of factors listed in the New
Mexico federal district court case, Pelton v. Methodist Hospital." Those factors

C. Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against
a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction is based upon this section.
D. Nothing contained in this section limits or affects the right to serve any process in any
other manner now or hereafter provided by law.
53. Id.
54. NMSA 1978, § 38-1-16(A)(I) (1971).
55. Caba, L.L.C. v. Mustang Software, Inc., 1999-NMCA-089, 1l 11,984 P.2d 803, 808.
56. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Conyers, 109 N.M. 243,245,784 P.2d 986,988 (1989) (holding
thatjurisdiction was proper over defendants who purchased insurance in New Mexico and thus transacted business
in the state); Salas v. Homestake Enters., Inc., 106 N.M. 344, 345, 742 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1987) (holding that
defendant corporation's telephonic invitation to plaintiff to visit defendant for further negotiations out-of-state did
not constitute transaction ofbusiness in New Mexico); Kathrein v. Parkview Meadows, Inc., 102 N.M. 75, 77, 691
P.2d 462, 464 (1984) (holding that defendant's solicitation of business within the state, telephone calls to the
consumer, and treatment of the consumer's spouse gave rise to the proper exercise ofjurisdiction); Cronin v. Sierra
Med. Ctr., 2000-NMCA-082, 21, 10 P.3d 845, 851 (holding that jurisdiction was proper over defendant hospital
where its active solicitation of patients in New Mexico constituted intentional, purposeful, and persistent
transaction of business in the state).
57. Caba, 1999-NMCA-089, 19, 984 P.2d at 810.
58. See NMSA 1978, § 38-1-16 (2004); supratext accompanying note 52.
59. 1999-NMCA-089, 984 P.2d 803.
60. Id. ft21-22, 984 P.2d at 810-11.
61. Id. IN 2-3, 984 P.2d at 806.
62. Id. 1 4, 984 P.2d at 806.
63. Id. 6-7, 984 P.2d at 806-07.
64. Id. 1 8, 984 P.2d at 807.
65. 989 F. Supp 1392, 1394 (D.N.M. 1997), quoted in Caba, 1999-NMCA-089, 1 12, 984 P.2d at 888.
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included a determination of (1) which party initiated the transaction, (2) "where the
transaction was entered into," and (3) where performance of the agreement was to
take place.66 The court found that the first Pelton factor was not met, as the parties'
initial conversation regarding their deal took place in California. 67 As to the second
factor, the court found that the transaction was not entered into in New Mexico
when the companies' only interaction came by way of phone, fax, and mail.68
Additionally, with respect to the third factor, the court of appeals held that no
transaction of business or minimum contacts existed sufficient to obtain personal
jurisdiction because only Caba's specific performance of the agreement was to take
place in New Mexico.69 In equating the transaction-of-business element with
minimum contacts, the court did not look at these facts in isolation, but instead
analyzed them in conjunction with other factors, such as the defendant's purposeful
availment of the forum.70 Thus, under Caba, a defendant will be found to have
sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process where the defendant has a
connection with the forum state and has acted in New Mexico in such a manner that
the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.7'
C. The Proliferationof the Internet and Subsequent PersonalJurisdictionIssues
In attempting to determine when personal jurisdiction is and is not proper, the
rapid proliferation of Internet technology has added new layers of analysis under
which federal and state courts must work.72 The U.S. Supreme Court has described
the Internet as "'an international network of interconnected computers' that allows
users to access a massive amount of information by connecting to a host
computer. 73 The Supreme Court further characterized the Internet as "a vast
platform from which to address and hear from a world-wide audience of millions
of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers."74 For the past ten years, courts
nationwide have struggled to find an appropriate manner to determine what kinds
of sites subject a Web operator to the jurisdiction of a foreign state in which a site
was accessed or used. 75
As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU,76 the Internet
applications that are most relevant to the establishment of personal jurisdiction are

66. Caba, 1999-NMCA-089, 1 12, 984 P.2d at 888 (citing Pelton, 989 F. Supp. at 1394).
67. Id. 13, 984 P.2d at 808.
68. Id. I 14-16, 984 P.2d at 809. "[A] nonresident does not engage in business in New Mexico when it
enters into contract with a New Mexico resident by mail, fax, and telephone without ever entering the state." Id.
i i6, 984 P.2d at 809.
69. Id.1 18, 984 P.2d at 810.
70. Id.(H 23-25, 984 P.2d at 811. For a discussion of purposeful availment, see supra text accompanying
notes 38-40.
71. Caba, 1999-NMCA-089, I 19-20, 984 P.2d at 810.
72. See generally Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 5, at 389-402.
73. Sublett v. Wallin, 2004-NMCA-089, 24,94 P.3d 845, 851 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
849-50 (1997)).
74. Reno, 521 U.S. at 853.
75. Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 5, at 389; see, e.g., Telco Communications Group, Inc. v. An Apple
a Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 404,406 (E.D. Va. 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (E.D.
Mo. 1996).
76. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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e-mail, listservs, newsgroups, chat rooms, and the World Wide Web. 7 ' The last of
these services, the Web, presents the arm of the Internet with which most ordinary
computer users are highly familiar. 78 A Web site consists of one or more pages
marked by "a unique 'address' that allows users to locate it" and to find a Web site
either by entering this address into an internet browser program or via the use of a
commercial search engine.7 9
The World Wide Web itself encompasses an even greater number of interactive
applications.80 For example, a Web site may require a user to provide login
information, which can range from a simple e-mail address and password to
providing a mailing address and/or other traditional contact information, to the
storing ofbilling information, including mailing and shipping addresses, credit card
numbers, and shopping preferences. Additionally, a Web site's message board or
site forum can provide a high degree of interactivity.8 Typically, these forums
require permanent login information from a user, thus allowing that user to post and
reply to messages on any given topic for public viewing over the Internet. Recently,
the promulgation of Web-logging (blogging) software has expanded independent
information publishing opportunities, as individuals now have the ability to
instantaneously post personalized anecdotes and opinions on their own blog sites.82
"With the Internet, the average computer blogger has, in effect, his or her own
printing press to reach the world."83
The broad range of services provided on the Internet can be categorized as
proactive and reactive."' Proactive services include e-mail, news groups, and
Telnet. 85 With e-mail, one of the Internet's most basic and popular services, a user
can send an electronic message to another user from practically any location in the
world.86 "News groups are a form of E-Mail through which people who share
common interests post messages in a public forum. 8 7 There are over "20,000 news
groups to which people can 'subscribe."' 88 In each of these systems, "messages are

77. Seeid.at851.
78. "The World Wide Web is the most well-known and visible part of the Internet." The Guide, World Wide
Web FAQ, at http://www.guide2net.net/articles/static/faqs/www.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
79. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 24, 94 P.3d at 851 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 852).
80. ISP Glossary, World Wide Web, at http://isp.webopedia.com/TERMfWWorld-WideWeb.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2005). Note that, contrary to popular belief, the World Wide Web is not synonymous with the term
"Internet." Id.; see also Webopedia, The Difference Between the Internet and the World Wide Web, at
http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Internet/2002/Web-vs-Internet.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
81. "[I]nteractive possibilities on the Internet such as message boards and chat rooms permit virtually
unlimited viewpoint dissemination from a multitude of independent 'sources."' Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC,
373 F.3d 372, 468 (3d Cir. 2004) (Scirica, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. See, e.g., Blogger, at http://www.blogger.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2005); Live Journal, at
http://www.livejournal.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
83. Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 281 (Ct. App. 2004) (Sills, P.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
84. Dennis F. Hernandez & David May, Personal Jurisdiction and the Net: Does Your Website Subject You
to the Laws ofEvery State in the Union?, L.A. DAILY J., July 15, 1996, available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/
iclp/dhdm.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. This number has likely gone up since the publication of the Hernandez and May article on July 15,
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directed by the writer either to a particular person or to a particular group of
people."89 Additionally, "[t]he Telnet service allows a user to physically access
remote computers as if they were" locally available.90
Reactive services include Gopher,9 Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP),92 File
Transfer Protocol (FTP), and the World Wide Web. FTP allows users to download
large-sized files electronically from a host computer.9 3 At its core, the World Wide
Web, while encompassing a number of lesser proactive and reactive services, allows
users to browse information passively at their leisure from any given location.94 In
sum, these reactive services enable searching and acquisition of data from a remote
computer known as a "Web server." 95 A Web server is "a program that accepts
requests for information framed according to the HyperText Transport Protocol
(HTTP). The server processes these requests and sends the requested document." 96
At their most basic level, each of these systems has the potential to transmit
information, whether it is public, personal, commercial, or otherwise, across state
lines and into a variety of different forums.97 With the rapid pace at which these
services have spread, courts have had a difficult time fashioning legal rules in
response to the progress of Internet technology. 98 This is particularly true when the
discussion turns to Web-based personal jurisdiction, given the Web's preeminence
and popularity as a medium for communication and commerce.99 It is no surprise,
then, that differing approaches to establishing personal jurisdiction over the World
Wide Web have arisen.
D. Two AnalyticalApproaches to Web-Based PersonalJurisdiction
1. The Expansive Approach of Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.
In evaluating approaches to Web-based personal jurisdiction, several federal
courts have followed the example set in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.100
In InsetSystems, the plaintiff, a Connecticut computer software developer/marketer,
sued the defendant, a computer technology/support corporation that was neither

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Gopher is a service that predates the existence of the World Wide Web "for organizing and displaying
files on Internet servers. A Gopher server presents its contents as a hierarchically structured list of files. With the
ascendance of the [World Wide] Web, many Gopher databases were converted to Web sites which can be more
easily accessed via Web search engines" such as Google or Yahoo, thus making Gopher an essentially "dead"
technology. ISP Glossary, Gopher,at http://isp.webopedia.com/TERM/G/gopher.html (last visited Mar. 25,2005).
92. HTrP is the Internet protocol that "defines how messages are formatted and transmitted, and what
actions [World Wide] Web servers and browsers should take in response to various commands." ISP Glossary,
Hyper Text TransferProtocol,at http://isp.webopedia.com/TERM/HfHrrP.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
93. ISP Glossary, File TransferProtocol, availableat http://isp.webopedia.comTERM/F/FTP.htm (last
visited Mar. 25, 2005).
94. See supranotes 72-83 and accompanying text.
95. Hernandez & May, supra note 84.
96. Id. (quoting QUE'S COMPUTER AND INTERNET DICTIONARY 554 (6th ed. 1995)).
97. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
98. See infra notes 100-139 and accompanying text.
99. See supranotes 72-75 and accompanying text.
100. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
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incorporated in nor conducted business in Connecticut on a regular basis.' °1 The
plaintiff company sued over the defendant's use of a trademark name belonging to
the plaintiff."2 The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut applied
Connecticut's long-arm statute to the defendant Web site owner, holding that the
owner "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business within
Connecticut. '13
The federal district court in Inset Systems based its holding on the notion that a
Web site is analogous to a print, television, or radio advertisement and becomes
more powerful due to the fact that it is continually accessible'." The court made its
ruling without evidence of the number of Connecticut users who accessed the site
in question; instead, the federal court assumed that thousands of Connecticut users
could access the site.0 5 Thus, it allowed for Connecticut's invocation of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant Massachusetts site owner. 0 6 In the years following
the Inset Systems decision, a handful of courts have adopted a similarly broad
standard.0 7 At the same time, a growing number of courts have become critical of
the Inset Systems approach,'0 8 and many have opted instead for the more narrow
approach found in Zippo ManufacturingCo. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.' 9
2. The Sliding Scale Approach of Zippo ManufacturingCo. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc.
In contrast to the broad, expansive approach to Internet-based personal
jurisdiction found in InsetSystems, the federal district court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania developed a "sliding scale" approach in the case of Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc."0 Zippo Manufacturing involved a
dispute over a Web site name between the manufacturer of Zippo cigarette lighters
and the owner of a Web site that sold subscriptions to an internet news service."

101. Id. at 162-63.
102. Id. at 163.
103. Id. at 165.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The fact that the court in Inset made its ruling despite a lack of evidence regarding the number of
users who accessed this particular site provided some of the grounds for criticism and rejection of this approach.
See infra note 108.
107. See Telco Communications Group, Inc. v. An Apple a Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 404,405-07 (E.D. Va
1997) (holding that Virginia jurisdiction was proper in a defamation suit against Web site operators who posted
negative press releases about the plaintiff); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-34 (E.D. Mo.
1996) (upholding personal jurisdiction in a trademark action against Web site operators where users signed up for
electronic mailboxes where they were to receive targeted electronic advertisements); State ex rel. Humphrey v.
Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715,720-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding Minnesota jurisdiction in
a consumer fraud action against Web site operators who claimed to offer legal sports gambling online), aff'd, 576
N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998).
108. See, e.g., Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1159 (W.D. Wis.
2004); S.Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540-41 (E.D. Pa. 1999); JB Oxford
Holdings, Inc. v. Net Trade, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Millennium Enters., Inc. v.
Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 922 (D. Or. 1999); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F.
Supp. 34, 41-42 (D. Mass. 1997); see also Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089,T126-29, 94 P.3d at 851-53.
109. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see infra text accompanying notes 110-129.
110. 952 F. Supp. at 1123-24.
Ill. ld. ati! 21.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

The court in Zippo Manufacturingcame to the conclusion that "the likelihood that
personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to
the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the
Internet." " 2 The court identified the existence of a "sliding scale" that places Web
sites on a continuum from active to passive.l"3 An active Web site allows users to
enter "into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the
knowing and repeated transmission of computer files.""' 4 On the other hand, a
passive Web site is one in which information is merely made available to interested
parties.115 Lying between these two ends of the continuum are "Web sites where a
user can exchange information with the host computer... [and] the exercise of
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site."' 16 At both the
state and federal level, many jurisdictions have adopted the Zippo Manufacturing
"sliding scale," or a similar test, in their attempts to resolve issues surrounding
Intemet-based personal jurisdiction." 7 The states that
have followed9 the Zippo
8
Ohio, 120
Minnesota,"
Manufacturing approach include California,'
Pennsylvania, 12' and Texas.12 2 The federal appellate courts ofthe Third,2 3 Fourth,' 24

112. Id. at 1124.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d414,419-20 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that California
jurisdiction was improper in a trademark action against operators of a Web site that had advertised construction
services); Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816, 820 (Ind.Ct. App. 1998) (holding that Indiana jurisdiction
was improper in a trademark action against a Web site operator whose site shared information about the plaintiff
corporation).
118. Nam Tai Elecs., Inc. v. Titzer, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769, 776-78 (Ct. App. 2001) (dismissing libel action
where messages posted on a California-based Internet message board were not found to be directed at the forum
state of California), overruledby Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002); Jewish Def. Org., Inc.
v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 620-23 (Ct. App. 1999) (denying jurisdiction in defamation suit where
court determined that defendants' Web posts constituted neither minimum contacts nor purposeful availment).
119. Croix Retail, Inc. v. Logiciel, Inc., No. A03-220, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1168, at *7-18 (Sept. 23,
2003) (upholding specific personal jurisdiction under five-factor test, finding that the nature, quality, and quantity
of defendant's electronic contacts, among other things, supported jurisdiction).
120. Edwards v. Erdey, 770 N.E.2d 672, 679 (Ohio 2001) (upholding jurisdiction based upon the level of
interactivity and the commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurred on Web site between plaintiff
and dcfendants).
121. Efford v. Jockey Club, 796 A.2d 370,374-75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (finding improperjurisdiction where
defendant's Web site fell into the "middle ground" of the sliding scale).
122. Gessmann v. Stephens, 51 S.W.3d 329, 339 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that appellant's Web site,
which posted appellant's name, logo, and e-mail link, were insufficient facts upon which to base specific
jurisdiction).
123. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451-52 (3d Cir. 2003) (mandating consideration
of Internet and non-Internet contacts beyond company's Web site that might suffice to bring defendant within
jurisdiction).
124. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714-15 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding no
jurisdiction where the court incorporated an "intentionality" requirement when fashioning a test for personal
jurisdiction in the context of the Internet).
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Eighth, 12 6 Ninth,'2 7 and Tenth 128 Circuits have also adopted the Zippo

Manufacturingapproach to one degree or another.'2 9

E. Determining an Approach to Internet-BasedPersonalJurisdictionin New
Mexico
Prior to the Sublett opinion, the federal district court for the District of New
3 ° In
Mexico applied a very similar standard to that found in Zippo Manufacturing.1
3
OriginsNaturalResources,Inc. v. Kotler, the court "analogized various... Internet
activities to more established forms of communication and information dissemination in order to create a working standard very similar to" the Zippo Manufacturing
sliding-scale approach.' 32 According to the court in Origins NaturalResources,
analyzing personal jurisdiction principles in the context of the Internet requires no
more of a departure from the traditional requirements of minimum contacts and due
process than had previous advances in communication or broadcast technology,
including the ascendance of the telegraph, telephone, fax, television, and radio.' 33
The court in OriginsNaturalResources compared passive postings of information on the Internet to "magazine or interstate billboard advertising."1 34 Determining
the target of Internet postings presents a number of problems, as the global reach
of the Internet could potentially subject defendants who post information on the
Web to virtually every jurisdiction in the world. 135 The court felt that this question
was not as problematic when applied to Web sites that are clearly "interactive,"
which the court analogized to telephone or mail communications.' 36 In either
scenario, the court in Origins Natural Resources essentially declared that the
"purposeful availment" analysis remains the dominant inquiry in questions
pertaining to jurisdiction.'37 Analyzing a defendant's prospects for being subjected

125. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 476 (5th Cir. 2002) (dismissing defamation action where author's
Internet bulletin board post neither referred to nor was directed at plaintiff's forum state); Mink v. AAAA Dev.
L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999) (denying jurisdiction where court found a Web site to be a passive
advertisement incapable of handling business orders online).
126. Lakin v. Prudential Sec., 348 F.3d 704, 712-14 (8th Cir. 2003) (denying specific jurisdiction that was
based in part on Internet contacts).
127. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that defendants' use
of an Internet Web page name was passive and that defendant had conducted no commercial activity in Arizona;
thus, their contacts with Arizona were insufficient to establish jurisdiction).
128. Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that
defendant did not engage in "substantial and continuous local activity" through its Web site for purposes of
jurisdiction).
129. For example, some courts have applied the Zippo rationale to questions of specific jurisdiction but have
declined to apply it to a general jurisdiction analysis. See, e.g., Lakin, 348 F.3d at 710-11; Revell, 317 F.3d at
470-71.
130. Origins Natural Res., Inc. v. Kotler, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1236 (D.N.M. 2001) (distinguishing Web
sites that are "interactive" from those that are not). Note that, despite the similar reasoning employed in both
opinions, Origins NaturalResources does not cite Zippo Manufacturingas persuasive authority.
131. 133 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D.N.M. 2001).
132. Mark S. Barron, A New Frontierfor Long Arm Jurisdiction:New Mexico's Search for Minimum
Contacts in Cyberspace, COM. BREAK, Winter 2004, at 7.
133. Origins NaturalRes., 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1236.
134. Id.
135. See Barron, supra note 132, at 7.
136. Origins NaturalRes., 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1236.
137. See Barron, supra note 132, at 7; see supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
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to the courts of a given jurisdiction, as well as the extent to which the defendant
benefits from the protections of thatjurisdiction's law, was held to be a determinant
analysis that must be done on a case-by-case basis. 3 ' Following OriginsNatural
Resources, the first New Mexico state court decision to touch upon the39 concept of
the Internet as applied to personal jurisdiction was Sublett v. Wallin.,
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Scott Wallin was a franchisee of Pillar To Post, Inc., a home inspection
business 1 ° incorporated in the state of Delaware.' 4 ' Sandra Sublett was a California
resident who had decided to purchase a house in New Mexico.' 42 Sublett learned of
Pillar To Post and Wallin's New Mexico franchise (also named Pillar To Post) via
a commercial Internet search engine and an advertisement in the Albuquerque
phonebook. 4 3 While visiting the Pillar To Post Web site, Sublett used a feature
labeled "Locate an inspector," whereupon she was asked to enter the name of the
city in which she planned to have a home inspected.'" Upon receiving information
about Wallin's Moriarty, New Mexico, franchise from the Pillar To Post Web site,
Sublett "contracted with Wallin to inspect a house that [she] planned to purchase
in Tijeras, New Mexico." ' 5 After purchasing the property, Sublett discovered that
the pipes in the home's heating system were made from a defective material that the
inspection had
not revealed, despite Sublett's claim that she specifically inquired
46
about them. 1
Sublett sued Wallin, the franchise, and Pillar To Post in the district court of
Bernalillo County on a number of theories, including negligence, fraud, and breach
of contract.'4 7 Sublett alleged that both Wallin, as franchisee, and Pillar To Post, as
franchisor, had reason to know that she would rely on Wallin's inspection in making
a decision to purchase the home.'4 8 At the trial court level, Pillar To Post moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting that the corporation was not
subject to the New Mexico long-arm statute,14 9 as Sublett had "failed to allege
sufficient facts to establish that Pillar To Post had minimum contacts with New
Mexico."' 50 Sublett responded by arguing that the Pillar To Post corporation's Web
site and its franchise relationship with Wallin were sufficient to sustain personal
jurisdiction. 5 ' In support of this contention, Sublett attached materials that included
her affidavit, a printout of the Web page listing Wallin's franchise under "Pillar To
Post in your area," and her check to "Pillar To Post" which had been endorsed

138. See Origins NaturalRes., 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1236.
139. 2004-NMCA-089, 94 P.3d 845.
140. Id. 1

141. Id.

, 94 P.3d at 847.

12, 94 P.3d at 848.

142. Id. 1 6, 94 P.3d at 847.

143. Id. 9 1, 6,94 P.3d at 847, 848.
144. Id. 6, 94 P.3d at 848.
145. Id. 1, 94 P.3d at 847.
146. Id.

2, 94 P.3d at 847.

147. Id.
148. Id.

3, 94 P.3d at 847.
88, 94 P.3d at 848.

149. NMSA 1978, § 38-1-16 (1971).

150. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089,
151. Id.

9, 94 P.3d at 848.
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' The district court dismissed
"Pillar To Post[,] Scott Wallin[,] For Deposit Only."152
53
Sublett's action, and her appeal ensued.'
Upon consideration of Sandra Sublett's appeal from the district court, in which
she alleged that defendant company "Pillar To Post had the requisite minimum
contacts with New Mexico" to sustain personal jurisdiction, 5 4 the New Mexico
55
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of her cause of action.'
Sublett asserted two grounds for the imposition of personal jurisdiction over Pillar
To Post: the company's relationship with Wallin and his franchise, and the
existence of the Pillar To Post Web site.'56 The court of appeals held "that the
franchise relationship in this case [did] not establish the basis for personal
jurisdiction," '5 7 and that Pillar To Post's "essentially passive" Web site also did not
comprise a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction.'58

IV. RATIONALE
At the outset, the New Mexico Court of Appeals observed that the sole issue to
be decided in Sublett was whether the district court correctly determined that it
lacked personal jurisdiction over Pillar To Post, a question of law to be reviewed
de novo 59 The court noted that, as a foreign corporation, Pillar To Post would have
been subject to the personal jurisdiction of a New Mexico district court only if its
conduct relating to Sandra Sublett's home purchase met a three-part test: (1) Pillar
To Post "must have done at least one of the acts enumerated in" the New Mexico
long-arm statute, 60 (2) Sublett's cause of action must have arisen from that act, and
(3) Pillar To Post must have sufficient minimum contacts with the state to satisfy
constitutional due process concerns. 161 In order to meet the first prong of this test,
Sublett must have shown that Pillar To Post performed an act included in the longarm statute; specifically, the court of appeals noted that Sublett's action must have
from the
arisen from Pillar To Post's transaction of business within
62 the state or
state.
the
within
act
tortious
a
of
commission
company's
After holding that the franchisor/franchisee relationship between Pillar To Post
1 63
and Scott Wallin was not sufficient to provide a basis for personal jurisdiction,
the court of appeals turned its attention to the existence of the Pillar To Post Web

152. Id. (alteration in original).
153. Id. 1 10, 94 P.3d at 848.
154. Id. 1 4, 94 P.3d at 847.
155. Id. 15, 94 P.3d at 847.
156. Id. 1 13, 94 P.3d at 849.
157. Id. 14, 94 P.3d at 847.
158. Id. 1 5, 94 P.3d at 847.
159. Id. 11, 94 P.3d at 848. As this was a question of law and not of fact, the court of appeals used the trial
court's record but reviewed the evidence and law without deference to the trial court's rulings. Id.
160. See supranotes 49-54 and accompanying text.
161. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 12, 94 P.3d at 848-49.
162. Id. 13,94 P.3d at 849; see NMSA 1978, § 38-1-16(A) (1971).
163. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 22, 94 P.3d at 851. According to the court, the Plaintiff"presented only
a bare franchiser/franchisee relationship without any additional indicia of business transactions in the state." Id.
As the analysis portion of this Note focuses on the second of Sublett's two asserted grounds for personal
jurisdiction (the Web site issue), much of the court's discussion of the issues surrounding the franchisor/franchisee
relationship, outside of those issues pertinent to the discussion of the Web site itself, have been omitted.
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site.164 Specifically, the court analyzed whether the site's feature permitting a user
to locate a local Pillar To Post franchise constituted a transaction of business and
provided adequate minimum contacts in New Mexico to support personal
jurisdiction.'65 The court noted that Sublett was the first166New Mexico state court
case to deal with the Internet in a jurisdictional context.
The court began its analysis with a brief background discussion regarding the
nature of the Internet. 167 Among the multitude of cases that attempted to resolve
jurisdictional questions regarding the Internet, the court of appeals identified the
emergence of the two major approaches discussed above:'68 the expansive view of
personal jurisdiction exemplified in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 16 9
and the "sliding scale" approach utilized in Zippo ManufacturingCo. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc. 170 Relying on more recent legal authorities, 171 the court cautioned that the
issue of Internet-based personal jurisdiction is "considerably more complex" than
either Inset Systems or Zippo Manufacturingmay let on. 172 The court further noted
that these approaches to Internet-based personal jurisdiction questions "operate with
the backdrop of due process concerns." 173
To decide what approach best suited the courts of New Mexico, the court of
appeals first looked to established case law regarding personal jurisdiction. 174 The
court noted that this particular case alleged specific jurisdiction, 75 as opposed to
general jurisdiction. 176 The court first reiterated "that a business that 'intentionally
initiated commercial activities in New Mexico for the purpose of realizing
pecuniary gain' subjects itself to personal jurisdiction" in the state.' 77 The court
went on to recognize that "it is [a] defendant's activities which must provide the
basis for personal jurisdiction, not the acts of other defendants or third parties.' 7 8
Moreover, the court noted its approval of the personal jurisdiction framework found
in CabaLtd. Liability Co. v. MustangSoftware, Inc.179 that evaluates who initiated

164. Id. 22,94P.3datS5l.
165. Id.123,94P.3dat851.
166. Id. T1 23-24, 94 P.3d at 851. "The question of whether a foreign corporation's Web site can support
a finding of personal jurisdiction in New Mexico is one of first impression." Id. 23, 94 P.3d at 851.
167. Id. 24, 94 P.3d at 851; see supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
168. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 25, 94 P.3d at 851; see supra text accompanying notes 100-129.
169. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996); see supra text accompanying notes 100-109.
170. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see supra text accompanying notes 110-129.
171. See Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 (W.D. Wis. 2004)
("[R]egardless how interactive a website is, it cannot form the basis for personal jurisdiction unless a nexus exists
between the website and the cause of action or unless the contacts through the website are so substantial that they
may be considered 'systematic and continuous."'); Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater
Certainyfor Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345 (2001).
172. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 25, 94 P.3d at 851.
173. Id.
174. Id. 1 28, 94 P.3d at 852.
175. See supra text accompanying note 18.
176. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 28,94 P.3d at 852 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
473 n.15 (1985)).
177. Id. (quoting Cronin v. Sierra Med. Ctr., 2000-NMCA-082, 1 22, 10 P.3d 845, 852).
178. Id. (quoting Visarraga v. Gates Rubber Co., 104 N.M. 143, 147, 717 P.2d 596, 600 (Ct. App. 1986))
(emphasis added).
179. 1999-NMCA-089, 984 P.2d 803.

Summer 2005]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

the transaction that becomes the basis for jurisdiction, where that transaction was
entered into, and where the performance was to take place.' 80
Based upon its analysis of the applicable case law, the court of appeals held that
the "more restrictive" approach of Zippo Manufacturing"is better suited to New
Mexico, at least where certain specific torts, such as defamation, are not
involved."'' In reaching this holding, the court found that the sliding-scale
approach emphasized "the degree to which the website operator intentionally
initiates the contacts" within New Mexico.' 82 Additionally, the court of appeals
opted for the Zippo Manufacturingstandard because it ensured "that the website
operator intended the site to facilitate interactive business-like exchanges with
users," thus minimizing "the possibilities that the actions of third parties" would
subject the site operator to personal jurisdiction.'83 Finally, the court noted that the
Zippo Manufacturing test inherently includes the84 three-part Caba analysis by
examining the level of interactivity of a Web site.
Upon accepting a Zippo Manufacturingtype approach to Internet-based personal
jurisdiction, the court of appeals held that the Pillar To Post Web site was "not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction."' 85 Based upon its review of the affidavit and Web
site printout provided by Sublett, the court found that the Web site merely provided
information about the nearest Pillar To Post franchise.' 8 6 According to the court,
personal jurisdiction has not been found in many cases where informational Web
sites are involved.'8 7 The court also found that "[t]he only interactive feature of the
website... was the 'Locate an inspector' feature, which requested minimal information and provided little more than additional advertising information...." 8 8 In total,
the court found that the features of the Web site made it "primarily passive" and,
thus, under the Zippo Manufacturingapproach, the court refused to apply personal
jurisdiction to Pillar To Post.'89
As it had noted that the three-part test of Caba was inherently part of the Zippo
ManufacturingWeb site analysis, the court of appeals went on to evaluate Sublett's
interaction with Pillar To Post in light of the Caba test. 90 The court found that it
was Sublett who initiated the Web site transaction by her use of a commercial
search engine.' 9 ' While still in California, Sublett received information on Wallin's
franchise, thus completing the transaction from the Web site.'92 Additionally, the
court found that all subsequent transactions occurred between Sublett and Wallin,

180.
181.
182.
183.

Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 28,94 P.3d at 852 (citing Caba, 1999-NMCA-089,
Id. 29, 94 P.3d at 852 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984)).
Id. 29, 94 P.3d at 852-53.
Id. 129, 94 P.3d at 853.

12,984 P.2d at 808).

184. Id.

185. Id.
186. Id. 30, 94 P.3d at 853.
187. Id. 29, 94 P.3d at 853 (citing Jason H. Eaton, Annotation, Effect of Use, orAlleged Use, ofInternet
on PersonalJurisdictionin, or Venue of FederalCourt Case, 155 A.L.R. FED. 535 § 4[b] (1999)).
188. Id. 30, 94 P.3d at 853.
189. Id. ( 30, 33, 94 P.3d at 853.
190. See id. 131,94 P.3d at 853. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text fora discussion of the Caba
test.
191. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 931, 94 P.3d at 853.
192. Id.
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none of which involved the Web site beyond Sublett's initial call to Wallin.'93
Finally, the court observed that there was no indication that Pillar To Post benefited
monetarily from this particular transaction; "Pillar To Post had 94already received its
benefit from the website by contracting with its franchisees."'1
The court summarized its ruling on Intemet-based personal jurisdiction by holding that a "degree of interactivity" is required before jurisdiction will be upheld.' 95
A passive, informational Web site, offering no opportunity for interaction, "will
ordinarily not be enough" to uphold personal jurisdiction.' 96 However, the court
contemplated the possibility of upholding jurisdiction for defamation, libel, or
trademark actions involving a passive Web site.' 97 The court concluded by
reiterating that the "issue of whether a particular defendant is subject to our longarm statute must be decided on a case-by-case basis."' 9' Having reaffirmed New
Mexico's ad hoc basis for determining personal jurisdiction, the court of appeals
left open the question of whether or not an active Web site would suffice to support
personal jurisdiction in a particular case. 99 However, as this case involved a passive
Web site, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal.2 "° The court
held that New Mexico had no personal jurisdiction from either the franchise
relationship or the existence of Pillar To Post's Web site.2"'
V. ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS
The vague standards regarding Internet-based personal jurisdiction set by the
Sublett opinion-in fact, the lack of a cohesive standard among the number of
federal and state courts to address this issue-should create a cause for concern in
the minds of Web designers, publishers, bloggers, and corporate information technology officers.20 2 From the Web designer's point of view, the Internet "constitutes
a vast platform from which to address and hear from a world-wide audience of
millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization
with a computer connected to the Internet can 'publish' information."20 3 However,
Web designers must now be conscious of what level of interactivity is going into
the sites that they create. Designers must be able to determine whether or not the
addition of a login script, message board, or tech support forum would subject them
or the site owners to personal jurisdiction in a given state. The problem, especially
with rulings such as the one in Sublett that essentially "punt" on the question of
what degree of interactivity is enough,2" is that a Web designer in one state may not

193. Id.
194. Id. 1 32, 94 P.3d at 853.
195. Id. 1 33, 94 P.3d at 853.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing Winward v. Holly Creek Mills, Inc., 83 N.M. 469, 471, 493 P.2d 954, 956 (1972)).
199. Id.
200. Id. 34,94 P.3d at 853.
201. Id. 11 22, 33, 94 P.3d at 851, 853.
202. See generally Stephen T. Mahar, Nothing Personal?PersonalJurisdictionand the Internet, LAW
PRODUCTS MAG. (forthcoming), available at http://www.usual.com/article8.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005);
Palmisano, supra note 1.
203. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997); see supra text accompanying notes 72-99.
204. See Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 1 33, 94 P.3d at 853.
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know what, if any, interactive Web services will subject his or her site to the
constraints of personal jurisdiction on a court-by-court basis. Even in this question's
relative infancy, it has posed problems for resolving the legal ramifications of Web
design; legal practitioners have already raised the concern that "[a]nyone who has
a web site or is thinking about having a web site should remember that the web site
may establish 'presence' in another state. The nature and extent of that 'presence'
may subject [a] website owner to the jurisdiction of courts in other states."2 5
Ultimately, what is necessary is a clearer delineation by the courts of what
constitutes a Web site that is interactive enough to establish personal jurisdiction
based on that Web presence alone, as well as a means of analyzing sites that are less
interactive but may in fact be one contact among many for ajurisdictional analysis.
A. "Active" versus "Passive" Web Sites
For purposes of determining whether or not their sites will subject them to
personal jurisdiction, Web site creators and administrators need to know whether
or not their site is "active" enough to establish the necessary contacts. As did the
vast majority of other state courts that followed the Zippo Manufacturing"sliding
scale" rationale, 0 6 the New Mexico Court of Appeals did not delineate exactly what
types of sites fall under the labels "passive," "active," or "middle ground., 20 7 From
the facts and holding of Sublett, all that one can be sure of is that the Pillar To Post
Web site, with its ZIP code locator and franchise information, absent any other
interactive feature, was "passive" in nature. 0 8 Further, under Sublett, it would take
a greater degree of interactivity before the site could be considered "active" such
that jurisdiction would be upheld. 2 9 As a result, Web designers, regardless of
whether or not they contemplate that their information will necessarily be viewed
in New Mexico, have little guidance in knowing whether or not their site is "active"
enough to subject them to personal jurisdiction within this state.
If Web interactivity, whereby one piece of information is exchanged for
another,210 truly is the benchmark, then it may be that a site program such as a login
script or sales profile would subject a Web site owner/operator to personal
jurisdiction. However, divining just what kind of information must be exchanged
is another matter. The New Mexico Court of Appeals seemingly rejected the use of
a store locator program as grounds for finding a site to be "active" sufficient for
purposes of personal jurisdiction.2 ' Such a program merely asks for an individual's
ZIP code or street intersection, information that is neither highly unique nor
personal.2 2 Perhaps the exchange of more personalized information, such as a

205. Palmisano, supra note 1.
206. See supra notes 117-129 and accompanying text.
207. See Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 30, 94 P.3d at 853.
208. Id.
209. Id. 1 33, 94 P.3d at 853.
210. Ralph F. Wilson, Web Interactivity and Customer Focus, WEB MARKETING TODAY, Aug. 25 1996,
available at http://www.wilsonweb.com/articles/interactive.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
211. Sublett, 2004-NMCA-089, 30,94 P.3d at 853.
212. See Wikipedia, ZIP Code, availableat http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZIPCode (last visited Mar. 25,
2005).
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name, address, phone number, and certainly credit card number, would suffice to
make a site "active" under the Sublett ruling.
B. Applications of Web-Based JurisdictionalLaw
Given the current state of Internet growth and the ease with which parties, from
individuals to corporations, can establish a Web presence,2" 3 there are literally
millions of potential plaintiffs who could attempt to assert jurisdiction via the
Internet. The implications of Web-based jurisdiction may very well change based
upon the size of the defendant. Take, for example, Wal-Mart, the world's leading
retailer.2" 4 This corporation not only has a physical retail presence in every state in
the United States, but it also maintains a Web site where customers may place
orders online." 5 In analyzing whether Wal-Mart has minimum contacts within any
given state, its Web presence is almost superfluous, because its physical presence
and business activities are already established with its brick-and-mortar stores.
Contrast this with a company such as Hastings, a media retailer that also has a
customer service-based Web presence,2" 6 but only has a physical presence within
twenty U.S. states.21 7 A customer can transact business with Hastings via this site
by placing an order for a product, thereby giving Hastings personal and credit
information online.21 8 However, given the lack of clarity on whether or not even this
exchange could be construed as "active" under Internetjurisdictionjurisprudence, 1 9
Hastings and companies like it will remain uncertain whether or not a customer in
a remote state could assert jurisdiction based on the company's Web presence
alone.
By and large, it may very well make sense to allow large corporations with both
a massive Web presence and brick-and-mortar stores nationwide to be sued in any
American forum. 220 However, the development of a vague rule that allows
individuals to drag smaller companies, or vice versa, "far across the country to
defend themselves from content related claims based upon a few hundred hits on
a Web site in that state" may not make for good policy. 22 1 To do so would require
such entities to keep tabs on the laws of every state in the nation, when their intent
may be to do nothing more than to sell products or spread ideas locally. More than
anything, it is best that those who maintain a Web presence, no matter what the size
or nature of it, know exactly what their site may subject them to in the realm of
litigation.

213. See supra text accompanying notes 72-99.
214. National Retail Federation, Retail Companies, at http://www.nrf.com/content/default.asp?folder=
foundation/caradvc&file=retailCompany.htm&bhcp=l (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
215. See Walmart.com, at http://www.walmart.com.
216. See Hastings Internet, Inc., at http://www.gohastings.com.
217. Hastings maintains brick-and-mortar stores in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming. Hastings Internet, Inc., Stores By State, at http://www.gohastings.com/About/
stores.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
218. Hastings Internet, Inc., Safe Shopping Guarantee, at http://www.gohastings.com/Help/newuser/
safeshopping.stm#safeshopping (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
219. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
220. Mahar, supra note 202.
221. Id.
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C. The Nature of Litigation May Inform When Web-Based PersonalJurisdiction
Is Upheld
In addition to the "passive" site versus "active" site issue, the Sublett ruling also
left open the question of whether or not Internet-based personal jurisdiction could
be upheld in cases of defamation, libel, or trademark actions involving a passive
Web site, though the court contemplated the possibility of such a finding.222 The
possibility of allowing for different Internet-based personal jurisdiction standards
based upon the nature of the suit brought against a defendant is also problematic.
The argument has been made that, "because the Internet is bringing unsophisticated
and poorly capitalized people into new situations where they are more likely than
ever to make innocent mistakes and be sued for them, due process guarantees
should be more robust in this new environment than they have been in more
traditional commercial settings. 223 Individual Web designers and bloggers can, and
will, make mistakes concerning the content of their Web sites and electronic
communications. With a vague standard for personal jurisdiction, suits for
defamation, copyright infringement, and trademark infringement, as well as suits
for relief in connection with other content-related claims, will be filed against these
"unsophisticated and undercapitalized" designers. 24
1. Defamation and Libel Litigation
It is possible that a mere posting of information on a Web site could alone be the
basis to find jurisdiction in a foreign state if the information involves defamatory
statements that are expressly directed at a resident of that state. In Calder v.
Jones,225 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction in a case involving a
defamatory article published by the National Enquirer about actress Shirley
Jones. 226 The Court found that the Enquirerreporters knew that Jones lived and
worked in California and that she would be injured most in that state.227 As such,
they should have "'anticipate[d] being haled into court there' to answer for the truth
of the[ir] statements, ' 22 ' even though the information in the article was not actively
"disseminated" by the Enquirer.22 9 The Court found that the "effects" of the
defamatory article were felt most strongly in that state. 231 Similarly, in the context
of a Web site, information does not flow directly to the recipient, but is posted and
available for anyone to view. If a defamatory statement regarding a California
resident is posted on a Web site based in New York, but the only person to view the
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223.
224.
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226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Sublett v. Wallin, 2004-NMCA-089, 33, 94 P.3d 845, 853.
Mahar, supra note 202.
Id.
465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Id. at 789-91.
Id. at 789-90.
Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
Id. at 789; see also Hernandez & May, supra note 84.
Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
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Web site lives in Florida, "it should make a significant difference to a court
considering whether to assert jurisdiction over the Website owner."23 '
Regarding Web-based personal jurisdiction, a minority of courts have relied on
Calder to focus on the location where the harm from actionable statements
occurred.232 In CaliforniaSoftware, Inc. v. Reliability Research,Inc.,233 the federal
district court for the Central District of California upheld personal jurisdiction over
a Nevada software seller who disseminated defamatory messages about a California
corporation by mail, telephone, and the Internet, in an effort to reach the
corporation's national sales base.234 Citing Calder,the California District Court held
that the resident plaintiff "felt the brunt of the harm from defendants' out-of-state
acts in California."23' 5 According to the court, the Internet postings would have been
sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction, so long as the plaintiff could show that
some prospective customers did in fact read the defamatory postings. 36 Calder's
influence in Internet personal jurisdiction cases has been slight, as most analysis has
centered instead on questions of purposeful availment.237 New Mexico, however,
has left this question open-the Sublett opinion addresses neither of these potential
approaches as the rule for this state.238 Therefore, it is questionable whether either
the Calder "effects test" standard or the "purposeful availment" test would apply
to a defamation case based upon Internet postings in this state.
2. Trademark Infringement Litigation
In much the same way as with courts dealing with defamation and libel suits,
courts have been split on the approach to dealing with trademark infringement over
the Internet. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Calder standard with
regard to trademark infringement cases in Cybersell,Inc. v. Cybersell,Inc. 39 In that
case, the court held that a Florida defendant company's contacts were insufficient
to establish "purposeful availment" within the forum state of Arizona.24 ° The court
declined to go further solely on the ground that the plaintiff Arizona company had
alleged trademark infringement over the Internet by the defendant's "use of the
registered name 'Cybersell' on an essentially passive web page advertisement."24 '
Otherwise, the court reasoned, "every complaint arising out of alleged trademark
infringement on the Internet would automatically result in personal jurisdiction

231. Hernandez & May, supranote 84.
232. Charles N. Davis, PersonalJurisdictionin On-Line Expression Cases: Rejecting Minimum Contacts
in Favor ofAffirmative Acts, Mar. 1999, at 6, available at http://www.bileta.ac.uk/pages/Conference%20Papers
.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
233. 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Ca. 1986).
234. Id. at 1357-58.
235. Id. at 1363.
236. Id. at 1363-64.
237. Davis, supra note 232, at 6.
238. The Sublett opinion does discuss the Caldereffects test with respect to defamation actions but makes
no affirmative holding approving of that rationale with respect to Internet defamation actions. Sublett, 2004NMCA-089, 29, 94 P.3d at 852.
239. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
240. Id. at419-20.
241. Id. at 420.
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wherever the plaintiffs principal place of business is located. '24 2 As a matter of
judicial economy and in deference to traditional notions of purposeful activity and
invocation of the benefits and protections of the forum state, the Ninth Circuit
rejected Calder with respect to Internet-based personal jurisdiction.243
Cybersell is illustrative of the choice-of-rule question regarding Internet-based
personal jurisdiction and trademark infringement, in that the court analyzed the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the "effects" and "purposeful availment"
tests. 2 ' A number of courts have aligned themselves with Cybersell in adopting a
purposeful availment test.24 5 As with defamation, however, in Sublett the New
Mexico Court of Appeals did not address what kind of test it would apply, if any,
to an action for trademark infringement over the Internet.
D. Preservingthe Internetas a DemocraticForum
Balanced against the rights of litigants to pursue civil actions is the notion of the
Internet as the last true populist forum for unrestricted speech. 246 Attempting to
invoke any type of restraint on a Web site could have a chilling effect on the
promulgation of Internet speech such as blogs, message board posts, and opinion
sites. Courts have shown a great willingness to acknowledge the importance of the
Internet as a forum for speech and association. 247 "In the information age, electronic
communications may be the most important forum for accessing and discussing
topics of concern to the community," and, as such, courts should be wary of allowing governmental regulation of this important medium. 2" The Internet's diversity
of viewpoints, characterized as a "universe of information," 249 is one of its core
strengths as a forum for unrestricted speech and advocacy. Individual citizens,
political candidates, businesses and corporations, community organizations, and
government entities "may use the Internet to disseminate information and opinions
about matters of local concern. '250 The Internet "help[s] citizens discharge the
obligations of citizenship in a democracy. '25' If the standards for establishing
personal jurisdiction over the Internet for defamation or libel actions remain vague
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 419-20. However, even where courts have had the opportunity to analyze the competing
approaches of"effects test" and "purposeful availment," they have not set down an affirmative holding that favors
one over the other. See, e.g., Sys. Designs, Inc. v. New Customware Co., 248 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1099 (D. Utah
2003) ("[T]his court finds it unnecessary to create aperse rule regarding direct trademark infringement [over the

Internet].").
245. See, e.g., Rainy Day Books, Inc. v. Rainy Day Books & Cafi, L.L.C., 186 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1163 (D.
Kan. 2002) (holding that defendant, through its website, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum under the sliding scale analysis developed for Internet activities); Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson,
698 N.E.2d 816, 820 (Ind. App. 1998) (holding that Indianajurisdiction was improper in a trademark action against
a Web site operator whose site shared information about the plaintiff corporation).
246. See Doe v. 2themart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092-93 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding that
defendant could not obtain the identity of speakers who participated anonymously on Intemet message boards).
247. See, e.g., Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that FBI could not
compel production of Internet access firms' customer records in connection with terrorism investigations).
248. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 439 (4th Cir. 2000) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
249. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 407 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting In re 2002 Biennial
Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,789 (June 2, 2003)).
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and open to question, anonymous Internet speakers may withhold their speech for
fear of being unmasked by having to respond to either criminal or civil litigation. 2
It is perhaps preferable that the courts should, if they adopt a standard at all, adopt
a very stringent standard for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the
proprietors of Web sites, out of respect for the preservation of the Internet as an
open democratic forum. While courts may hesitate to establish "bright-line" rules
on any subject,2 53 let alone Web-based personal jurisdiction, the sheer magnitude
of Web diversity mandates that a line be drawn somewhere.
E. Due Process Concerns
Providing the backdrop for all of the foregoing concerns regarding the exercise
of Web-based jurisdiction is the basic notion of due process. 4 In terms of
jurisdiction, due process requires that the defendant have minimum contacts with
the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions
of fairplay and substantial justice." 255 In the wake ofInternationalShoe, the former
prerequisite of a party's presence in the forum256 has been eliminated as a
requirement for the satisfaction of due process. 257 Naturally, one would tend to
believe that a great deal of Internet activity could potentially fall under the umbrella
of "minimum contacts" sufficient to satisfy due process. 25 ' However, the
predominant minimum contacts tests include an element of knowledge or intent.25 9
Essentially, defendants must purposefully direct activities to the forum or avail
themselves of the benefits of the forum.26 ° Purpose should presume knowledge;
however, it is the Web-based defendants' lack of knowledge that they may be haled
into a foreign court for their Internet activities that merits a strict due process
analysis of the propriety of Web-based jurisdiction.
Under purposeful direction or availment, defendants intentionally direct activities
toward a forum or otherwise make use of the forum in a conscious manner.26 1 Web
publishers, however, may not be fully cognizant of how individuals in any given
forum interact with their sites. To that end, a Web user does not knowingly or
purposefully choose to interact within a state several hundred miles away merely
by posting on a message board or a blog. To expect a defendant's acquiescence to
the laws of a foreign state when that defendant neither knew of nor intended his or
her site's interactivity within that state is contrary to InternationalShoe's notions
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253. See supra text accompanying notes 100-139.
254. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
255. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463
(1940)); see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
256. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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of traditional justice and fair play.262 In fact, it has been suggested that courts must
look to the subjective intent of the Web publisher in analyzing the due process
concerns of Web-based personal jurisdiction. 26 3 According to some scholars, the
'2
trend among courts "appears to be to look at the intent of the web site owner. 1
"Where evidence demonstrates an intent to do business or have an effect in the
forum state, personal jurisdiction will be found to comport with the requirements
If nothing else, this trend suggests that courts should incorporate
of due process.
an element of intent as a prerequisite, if not a hard-and-fast requirement, when
attempting to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant via the Web.
In light of the considerations discussed above, it seems proper that fully interactive sites, complete with login information and a commercial transaction element,
are the types of sites that merit the "active" label and support the establishment of
jurisdiction. As the court in Sublett correctly noted, "passive" sites at the other end
of the sliding scale merit no such finding.26 6 Those in the middle are a tougher
call-it would be unsurprising to see courts analyzing these sites as one contact
among many in a minimum contacts analysis. At the very least, courts should spell
these propositions out. However, their hesitance to do so leaves Web site operators
in a bit of a legal quandary.
Surprisingly, many legal scholars seem content to conclude that, since a Web site
owner/operator publishes with the knowledge that "the world is watching," the site
owner is purposefully directing the site's activities to a worldwide audience and,
thus, to a worldwide jurisdiction. 267 This conceptualization could effectively
transform the Internet into a sort of "self-censorship Olympics. 2 68 That appears to
be the safest route to take, given the lack of a discernible standard for basing
personal jurisdiction on a defendant's Web presence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in a case of first impression, held that a
passive Web site cannot furnish sufficient nminimurn contacts for the establishment
of personal jurisdiction in a civil action, at least where certain specific torts, such
as defamation, are not involved. 69 Essentially, the court ended its discussion there
while many pertinent questions remained, such as what exactly constitutes a
"passive" or "active" Web site,270 when does a site become "active" enough to merit
personal jurisdiction against its owner, 271' and when does the nature of the legal
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claim asserted change the analysis."' The Sublett opinion is reflective of the general
uncertainty among both state and federal courts about where to draw the bright line
separating.Web sites that do merit the assertion of personal jurisdiction from those
that do not.2 3
All that can be said of Internet-based personal jurisdiction at the moment is that
proprietors of passive Web sites are safe, so long as they are not committing the
specific torts of libel, defamation, or trademark infringement.7 " Apart from that, the
standard is unclear for discerning what type of site, if any, is interactive to the point
of subjecting its owner, proprietor, or creator to the jurisdiction of a New Mexico
court. In the near future, New Mexico courts should have the opportunity to explore
these issues further; with the rapidly growing realm of e-commerce and Internet
speech, a resolution reached sooner would be infinitely preferable to later.
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